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We model an enforcement problem where firms can take a known and lawful action or seek a profitable 
innovation that may enhance or reduce welfare. The legislator sets fines calibrated to the harmfulness of 
unlawful actions. The range of fines defines norm flexibility. Expected sanctions guide firms’ choices among 
unlawful actions (marginal deterrence) and/or stunt their initiative altogether (average deterrence). With loyal 
enforcers, maximum norm flexibility is optimal, so as to exploit both marginal and average deterrence. With 
corrupt enforcers, instead, the legislator should prefer more rigid norms that prevent bribery and misreporting, at 
the cost of reducing marginal deterrence and stunting private initiative. The greater the potential corruption, the 
more rigid the optimal norms. 
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   1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is generally recognized that when private actions generate externalities, for instance in
the form of diﬀuse social harm, public intervention can improve welfare. In this case, public
policy must trade oﬀ the beneﬁt of social harm reduction with enforcement and compliance
costs, and possibly with the agency costs due to bureaucrats’ self-serving behavior.
It is less frequently acknowledged that norms and their enforcement may have yet another
cost: that of stiﬂing private sector innovation that may open proﬁt opportunities but entail
risks for society, such as research and development (R&D) activity. The idea that public
intervention may stiﬂe valuable private initiative dates back at least to the work of Friedrich
Hayek (1935, 1940). But there is no formal analysis, to the best of our knowledge, of how
the optimal design and enforcement of norms should take into account the beneﬁts and risks
stemming from private innovative activity.
In this paper we propose such an analysis, by modeling a setting where ﬁrms can take
a known and lawful action (“business as usual”) or exert initiative to learn about new
proﬁtable actions (“innovation”). Learning about new proﬁtable actions opens the way
to private activities that may beneﬁt or harm society — creating a positive or negative
externality. The legislator must decide how to take into account both the possible social
beneﬁts and the risks created by private initiative. In designing and enforcing norms, he
can act on two diﬀerent margins: the private decision to invest in research eﬀort or not, and
the choice of the private actions once innovation succeeds.
One class of examples arises in connec t i o nw i t hR & Da c t i v i t ya n ds c i e n t i ﬁc uncertainty.
For instance, a biotech ﬁrm may either produce traditional seeds or research new genetically
modiﬁed (GM) seeds that promise higher yields but pose unknown risks to public health
(causing allergies in consumers or spreading to neighboring plots).
A second class of examples refers to the introduction of new products in an uncertain
market environment. For instance, a software developer may either market its existing
products or try to develop a new application tied to an operating system. Depending on the
circumstances prevailing when the innovation will be marketed, the new software may raise
consumer welfare (due to its greater ease of use) or induce market foreclosure. Which eﬀect
will prevail depends on the alternative products and ﬁr m st h a tw i l lb ep r e s e n to nt h em a r k e t
when the new software will be introduced. Hence, apart from the strategic intentions of the
software company regarding the possible eﬀects of its new application, the true consequences
of the innovation on market equilibria will depend also on a set of random events that are
o u to ft h ec o n t r o lo ft h ed e v e l o p e r .
Yet another class of cases may occur in ﬁnancial markets: ﬁnancial innovation, such as
—1—the introduction of new instruments or markets, may create new proﬁt opportunities for
intermediaries as well as new hedging opportunities for investors, but may also create new
dangers for uninformed investors who cannot master the information necessary to handle
novel instruments or trade on new markets.
In each of these cases, public policy should design ﬁnes and enforcement so as to prevent
the actions most harmful to society, while trying to preserve ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate.1
The range of ﬁnes chosen by the legislator deﬁnes the extent to which ﬁnes can be calibrated
to the social harmfulness of private actions. In other words, it determines norm ﬂexibility.
The expected sanctions will then guide both how ﬁrms exploit innovation and their
incentives to seek innovation in the ﬁrst place. Otherwise stated, sanctions may induce ﬁrms
to choose less socially harmful actions once they have innovated — the well-known marginal
deterrence eﬀect — and/or reduce the probability of innovation, and thereby discourage any
n e wa c t i o nb yt h eﬁrm irrespective of its harmfulness — an eﬀe c tt h a tw el a b e laverage
deterrence. While marginal deterrence is always desirable and calls for more enforcement,
average deterrence improves welfare only when social harm is suﬃciently likely. When
instead social harm is unlikely, average deterrence calls for lower enforcement to avoid
stiﬂing innovation too much.
Indeed, if the social risks stemming from private innovation are suﬃciently remote, it
is optimal to adopt a “laissez-faire” regime (a per-se legality rule), where private initiative
is eﬀectively free to unfold its eﬀects. Interestingly, if initiative is needed to learn about
new actions a laissez-faire regime is more likely to be optimal than in the traditional model
where ﬁrms are not required to make any eﬀort to learn about such actions. In this sense,
when innovation is an important component of private activities, norms should be less
interventionist.
Another result of the paper is that the optimal degree of ﬂexibility of the law depends
on the loyalty of enforcers. If enforcers can be trusted to be completely loyal, the legis-
lator should choose the maximum degree of norm ﬂexibility, so as to maximize marginal
deterrence. When instead enforcers can be corrupted, the optimal design and enforcement
of norms must take their incentives into account. Enforcement oﬃcials can extract a bribe
from ﬁrms in exchange for misreporting their actions, leading to lower ﬁnes for noncompli-
ers. In this case the legislator cannot simply rely on stiﬀ ﬁnes to repress the most harmful
actions, lest ﬁrms will prefer to bribe oﬃcials rather than refrain from such actions. In
order to cope with bribery, the legislator has to tolerate relatively more harmful actions,
leaving some rents to ﬁrms. This decreases marginal deterrence compared to the case where
1For instance, in the example where product innovation may lead to entry foreclosure, competition policy
should try to prevent abuses of dominant positionsw i t h o u tc h i l l i n gt h ei n c e n t i v e st oi n n o v a t e .
—2—enforcers are loyal. To compensate this decrease in marginal deterrence, the legislator will
have to rely more heavily on average deterrence by reducing the incentives to invest in ini-
tiative: when social harm is suﬃciently likely, it is best to raise the minimum ﬁne so as to
discourage initiative.
Therefore, the more corruptible the enforcers, the more rigid the optimal norm: the range
of ﬁnes decreases with the degree of enforcers’ loyalty, which is measured by the minimum
bribe that induces the enforcer to misreport (a higher minimum bribe corresponds to greater
loyalty). Hence, agency problems in enforcement reduce the ﬂexibility of norms, limiting
marginal deterrence and aﬀecting average deterrence.
This paper contributes to two research areas: that which focusses on the costs and
beneﬁts of public intervention in the presence of market failures, and that which deals with
law enforcement. In the ﬁrst of these two areas, several papers highlight that intervention
should be curtailed if its enforcement is very expensive or generates the incentive to demand
and pay bribes to enforcers (Krueger, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Banerjee, 1997; Acemoglu
and Verdier, 2000; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Immordino and Pagano, 2005, among others).
This literature does not consider the eﬀect of norms on innovative activity by the private
sector. Public intervention can aﬀect innovation at both its typical stages: (i) learning of
new products or processes, and (ii) their industrial and commercial exploitation. It can
reduce the incentives to invest in learning, or direct newly acquired knowledge to the use
that is least harmful to society; considering both of these aspects leads to novel results.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on optimal law enforcement (Becker 1968,
Becker and Stigler 1974, Polinsky and Shavell 2000 and 2001, Shavell 1993, among others).
The model put forward here has some elements in common with the “activity level” model
analyzed in this literature.2 In this model, private beneﬁts and social harm depend on two
diﬀerent decisions of private agents — an activity level (say, how long an individual drives
a car) and a level of precaution (driving speed) — and the analysis tipically compares the
eﬀects of diﬀerent liability rules (strict versus fault-based liability). In our paper the role
of initiative is reminiscent of the activity level, while the choice of new actions parallels
the choice of precaution. But the information structure of our setting diﬀers from that
of these models, since the choice about initiative is made before the state of the world is
known, while in the “activity level” model uncertainty plays no role. Uncertainty allows us
to analyze how the optimal norm and its enforcement change depending on the likelihood
that innovation will cause social harm.
The literature on law enforcement concentrates on the marginal deterrence eﬀect of
enforcement (Stigler, 1970; Shavell, 1992; Mookherjee and Png, 1994, among others). As
2See, for instance, Shavell (1980, 2006) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
—3—already mentioned, in our setting enforcement may also reduce the probability of innovation
and thereby discourage any action by the ﬁrm, whether socially harmful or beneﬁcial. This
eﬀect, which we label average deterrence, arises because in our setting the set of possible
private actions is not exogenously given, as traditionally assumed, but depends on a private
decision (innovation), which can in turn be aﬀected by public intervention.3 The endogeneity
of the set of actions by the agent is reminiscent of Aghion and Tirole (1997), and as in
that paper the eﬀort of the principal (enforcement by oﬃcials) depresses the initiative of
the agent (innovation by ﬁrms). The diﬀerence is that in our model the principal’s eﬀort
cannot directly substitute for the ﬁrm’s initiative: the legislator can depress the biotech’s
investment in R&D or aﬀect the type of seeds that it will market if successful, but cannot
itself undertake R&D.
Our setting also allows us to address the issue of the optimal degree of ﬂexibility of the
law, measured by the range of ﬁnes applicable by enforcement oﬃcials. This is a mute issue
in the traditional analysis of enforcement, where the legislator always wishes maximum ﬂex-
ibility so as to maximize marginal deterrence — as indeed we ﬁnd under loyal enforcement.
(This may explain why the range of ﬁnes is exogenous in the law enforcement literature.)
H o w e v e r ,t h ec h o i c eo fﬂexibility becomes relevant when there are agency problems in en-
forcement, as also shown in this paper. This echoes other results in the literature showing
that collusion reduces the instruments that principals can use to provide incentives to agents
—ap o i n tﬁrst made by Tirole (1986) in his analysis of a three-tier contracting relation be-
tween a principal, a supervisor and an agent. Tirole shows that the optimal contract oﬀers
low-powered incentives to the agent to prevent him from colluding with the supervisor. Laf-
font and Tirole (1993, Chapter 11) make a similar point in the context of the regulation of
industry.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
case of loyal oﬃcials, and Section 4 that of unloyal oﬃcials. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model with a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm, a benevolent legislator and — for the
time being — a loyal enforcer. The ﬁrm can either choose one among several known and
3To our knowledge, Kaplow (1995) is the only paper where the design of the law aﬀects agents’ learning
decisions. In his setting, more complex rules allow better control over individual behaviour but are harder
for people to understand ex ante and for courts to apply ex post. In his setting, individuals can choose
not to learn, and take actions ignoring the associated eﬀects (and ﬁnes). Our model diﬀers from his in
that new actions can be taken only upon learning. Moreover, our notion of norms’ ﬂexibility refers to the
ability to ﬁne-tune sanctions to actions, while Kaplow’s notion of norms’ complexity refers to the detail in
the description of what is lawful or not.
—4—lawful actions, or invest in learning how to carry out new actions, whose private and social
eﬀects are unknown ex ante. For instance, a biotech ﬁrm may either produce traditional
seeds or experiment with a new GM seed that promises higher yields but poses unknown
risks to public health.
The legislator may constrain the ﬁrm’s operations by legal norms and associated penal-
ties. To maximize social welfare, he must take into account the tradeoﬀ between the social
dividend arising from the ﬁrm’s innovations (a larger harvest, in the previous example) and
the potential social damage stemming from them (a public health hazard). The key issue
that we wish to explore is how this tradeoﬀ shapes the optimal design of legal norms and
their enforcement.
The ﬁrm can choose the status-quo action a0 (planting traditional seeds) with associated
proﬁts Π0 and welfare W0. Action a0 i st h em o s tp r o ﬁtable of implementable legal actions.





that is diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave in a ∈ A.
Depending on the state of nature s, the social consequences of new actions are described
by one of two diﬀerent functions. With probability 1 − β, a good state s = g occurs:
new actions improve welfare, according to an increasing function W = W(a) such that
W(a) > W0 and W(a)=W. In this state, there is no conﬂict between private and social
incentives, since Π0(a) > 0 and W
0
(a) > 0. With probability β, instead, a bad state s = b
occurs, where new actions have a negative social externality. Welfare is described by a
decreasing function W = w(a) such that w(a) 6 W0 and w(a)=W < W with w
00
(a) 6 0.
In this case, private incentives conﬂict with social welfare since Π0(a) > 0 but w0(a) < 0.
Nature chooses which state of the world occurs; hence, the probability β of the bad state
(social harm) is an ex-ante measure of the misalignment between public interest and ﬁrms’
objectives.4 In our example, β is the prior probability that the GM seeds will be hazardous
to public health.
The ﬁrm knows from the beginning how to carry out the status-quo action a0.I n
contrast, carrying out any new action, requires an investment in learning (experiments
with GM seeds), which accordingly will be referred to as “initiative”. If the investment is
successful, the ﬁrm will discover how to carry out the new actions A =[ a,a].I nt h i sc a s e ,
the ﬁrm also learns the state of nature, that is whether its innovation is socially harmful.
Proceeding with our example, the biotech company learns not only how to produce new GM
seeds, but also the dangers that they pose to public health.
4A more complex setting can be imagined, in which social harm arises only over a subset of the new
actions in A, so that even in the bad state not all the projects are socially harmful. This extension would
complicate the analysis without adding any substantive result.
—5—The amount of resources I that the ﬁrm invests in learning determines its chances of
success: for simplicity, the ﬁrm’s probability p(I) of learning how to carry out the new
actions A is assumed to be linear in I,i . e .p(I)=I with I ∈ (0,1]. The cost of learning is




with c>Π − Π0 to ensure an internal solution.
The institutional framework in the design and enforcement of norms is as follows. The
legislator writes the norm, which speciﬁes legal and unlawful actions and the ﬁnes to be
inﬂicted. The enforcement oﬃcials seek evidence on noncomplying ﬁrms and report it to
the judges (or authority commissioners) who apply the norm. Since we are assuming that
judges never make errors, their decisions are completely dependent on the evidence that the
oﬃcials report. Moreover, in the benchmark model we assume that oﬃcials are loyal and
report all the collected evidence. For this reason, in the benchmark model, norm design and
enforcement are entirely chosen by the legislator, since neither oﬃcials nor judges have any
real decision to take. However, in Section 4, the role of corrupt oﬃcials will be explicitly
considered when we analyze the case in which they try to exploit their discretionary power.
The norm written by the legislator speciﬁes how to distinguish between legal and illegal
actions, and how the latter are punished. Thereby it determines the scope of enforcement
activity. Norms can diﬀer by their degree of ﬂexibility, that is, by the extent to which
penalties can be calibrated according to the consequences of the ﬁrms’ actions. We consider
a norm written as follows:
The action a ∈ A is illegal if ex-post socially damaging, i.e. if W 6 W0. Illegal





obeying a principle of proportionality, i.e. ﬁnes are non-
decreasing in social harm W0 − w(a).
Therefore, norms have three features. First, they are eﬀect-based, that is, they punish
only actions that are ex-post socially damaging and in proportion to the social harm they
cause.5 Second, the legislator sets the boundaries of enforcement activity. These boundaries




and a maximum ﬁne F ∈ [F,F max] and a general
principle of proportionality, where Fmin and Fmax are boundaries that characterize the legal
system.6 Third, the closer the minimum and the maximum ﬁne, the lower the ﬂexibility
5For a discussion on an eﬀect-based interpretation of antitrust norms, see Gual et al. (2005).
6The common wisdom among lawyers is that Fmin > 0, meaning that illegal actions must be punished.
But in principle the legislator may wish to abstain from punishing or subsidize certain illegal actions, as in
the case of leniency programs for “whistleblowers” in antitrust enforcement (Motta and Polo, 2003).
—6—that the legislator retains in setting the ﬁnes. Hence, the degree of ﬂexibility is deﬁned by




speciﬁed in the norm.
Since ﬁrms choose actions and initiative according to the level of the corresponding
expected ﬁnes, the legislator has to set not only the level of ﬁnes but also their enforcement,
that is, the amount of resources E devoted to detecting non-complying ﬁrms (for instance,
the budget allocated to the environmental or health protection agency). These resources
determine the probability q(E) that the enforcer correctly identiﬁe st h ea c t i o nc h o s e nb yt h e
ﬁrm and learns its social consequences W, and therefore its lawfulness. For simplicity, we
assume the probability q(E) to be linear in E,i . e .q(E)=E. The cost of the enforcement
eﬀort is convex, implying decreasing returns to enforcement: g0 > 0 and g00 > 0 for E ∈ (0,1],
with g(0) = g0(0) = 0 and limE→1 g(E) = limE→1 g0(E)=∞.W i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 − q(E),
the authority’s investigation does not unearth enough evidence to inﬂict any ﬁne on the
ﬁrm.
The timing of the model is described in Figure 1. At time 1, the legislator writes the





. It also allocates the resources E to enforcement. At time 2, the ﬁrm, knowing
the norm and the enforcement level, chooses its initiative I and learns how to carry out the
new actions with probability p(I)=I and which is the state of the world. At time 3,t h e
ﬁrm chooses an action, conditional on what it learnt in the previous stage. Finally, at time
4 actions produce their private payoﬀs Π and their social eﬀects W; enforcement oﬃcials
collect evidence with probability q(E)=E and report it to judges, who determine the actual
ﬁnes.
[Insert Figure 1]
Finally, we assume the following ranking among payoﬀs:
W − W0 > Π − Π0 > F. (1)
The ﬁrst inequality implies that in the good state, social gains exceed private ones, or,
equivalently, that new actions in good state increase consumer surplus as well as producer
surplus. The last inequality says that the maximum payoﬀ from initiative exceeds the
maximum ﬁne even when this is inﬂicted with certainty. According to this assumption, we
focus our analysis on the case of incomplete deterrence, that is, ﬁrms always prefer to take
some unlawful action if they learn how to take it.
—7—3L o y a l o ﬃcials
We now proceed to analyze the equilibrium of the game in the benchmark case where enforce-
ment oﬃcials are loyal in reporting the collected evidence. We solve the game backwards,
starting from the last stage, in which the ﬁrm chooses its action.
3.1 Firm actions
The choice of actions at stage 3 depends on whether the ﬁrm’s initiative was successful or not,
a n do nt h eﬁne schedule F(a) designed by the legislator. If the initiative was unsuccessful,
under our assumptions the ﬁrm prefers the status-quo action a0 rather than a random new
a c t i o n . L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ei n i t i a t i v ew a ss u c c e s s f u l ,s ot h a ti ta l l o w s
the ﬁrm to take new actions a ∈ A. If these are not socially harmful (s = g) ,a l lo ft h e m
are lawful, so that the ﬁrm chooses the proﬁt-maximising action a, which also yields the
maximum welfare W. If instead the new actions produce a negative externality (s = b), and
therefore are unlawful, under the incomplete deterrence assumption (1) the ﬁrm chooses the
unlawful action that maximizes its proﬁts, net of the expected ﬁne.
Then, given the ﬁne schedule F(a),t h eﬁrm will select the action
b a =a r gm a x
a∈A
[Π(a) − EF(a)]
The features of the optimal ﬁne schedule will be analyzed later on, when optimal policy
design will be considered. We summarize the above discussion in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 At stage 3, given E and F(a),t h eﬁrm chooses the following actions:
• a0 if learning is unsuccessful;
• a if learning is successful and new actions are not socially harmful (s = g);
• b a if learning is successful and new actions are socially harmful (s = b).
3.2 Firm initiative
At stage 2 the ﬁrm chooses its initiative I so as to maximize its expected proﬁts, given the
optimal actions that it will choose at stage 3. In terms of our example, the biotech ﬁrm
chooses how much to invest in R&D on GM seeds, taking into account which seeds it will
produce and market if its R&D eﬀort is successful. Its expected proﬁts at this stage are:




—8—where the ﬁrst term is the status-quo proﬁt, the second term is the expected gain from
initiative (net of the expected ﬁnes) and the third term is the cost of initiative.7
Lemma 2 At stage 2, given E and F(a), the optimal level of initiative is:
b I =( β[Π(b a) − EF(b a)] + (1 − β)Π(a) − Π0)/c.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition:
β[Π(b a) − EF(b a)] + (1 − β)Π(a) − Π0 − cb I =0 , (3)
where the second order condition is obviously satisﬁed.
3.3 Norm design
Having derived the optimal action and initiative chosen by the ﬁrm for given policy para-
meters, we now turn to the analysis of the design and enforcement of norms. As already
claimed, in our setting, judges do not make errors given the evidence provided, and enforce-
ment oﬃcials are loyal, reporting all the evidence they obtain. Hence, enforcement depends
only on the resources E that the legislator assigns and on the availability of the evidence,
with no discretionary role for judges and oﬃcials. The focus of the analysis is therefore on
the choices of the legislator on the ﬁnes and the resources committed to enforcement.
The legislator inﬂuences the choices of the ﬁrm in two ways: by aﬀecting the selection of
the action a in case of successful learning, and by inﬂuencing the incentives to exert initiative
eﬀort I.T h eﬁrst eﬀect, well known in the law and economics literature, captures marginal
deterrence, that is, the law’s ability to guide private choices among unlawful actions.8 The
second eﬀect, which is not considered in traditional models of law enforcement, derives from
the impact of the norm on initiative and therefore on the probability that any new action a
will be taken. We label this second eﬀect average deterrence. The legislator sets the policy
parameters considering both eﬀects on private choices and, ultimately, on welfare.
Starting with the marginal deterrence problem, since in general w(b a) > W and w0 < 0,
the legislator will set the ﬁne schedule so as to elicit the lowest possible b a. In our example,
the environmental agency induces ﬁrms to opt for the safest type of GM seeds that can be
elicited. Given that the proﬁt function Π(a) is increasing, it is easy to show that, within the
7The second term is always positive, by equation (1): incomplete deterrence implies that the ﬁrm always
gains from initiative.
8See the seminal work by Stigler (1970) and, for a more general treatment, Mookherjee and Png (1994).




F if a 6 e a
F if a>e a
We rely on Figure 2 to illustrate this point. The function F(a) shifts the proﬁt function Π(a)
downward by F to the left of point e a,a n db yF to its right, creating a local maximum at e a.
The legislator wants to induce the ﬁrm to choose e a,t h a ti st om a k ee a a global maximum,
i.e. e a = b a. This requires that
Π(e a) − EF > Π(a) − EF.
Finally, among the global maxima b a the legislator will pick up the lowest action b a,i no r d e r
to minimize social harm. We call b a as the implemented action, that is implicitly deﬁned by
the equality
Π(b a) − EF = Π(a) − EF, (4)
or
b a = Π−1[Π(a) − E(F − F)].
Figure 2 shows how the implemented action is identiﬁed.
[Insert Figure 2]
The ﬁgure also helps understanding why the ﬁne schedule F(a) is not the only one,




, that can induce the action b a:
any such function that penalizes action b a with F and action a with F will induce the same
choice. For example, the same result follows if actions below b a are punished with F and
those above it with a penalty that makes expected proﬁts constant.
Notice that a higher enforcement eﬀort E increases marginal deterrence:
∂b a
∂E
= −Π−10[.](F − F) 6 0, (5)
and so does a wider range of ﬁnes, since:
∂b a
∂F
= Π−10[.]E > 0,
∂b a
∂F
= −Π−10[.]E 6 0. (6)
Next, since the implemented action implies Π(b a) − EF = Π(a) − EF, the expected
proﬁts at stage 2 can be written, after substituting, as:





b I =[ Π − Π0 − βEF]/c. (7)














and therefore is a continuous and decreasing function of enforcement activity. This is rem-
iniscent of a result in contract theory proved by Aghion and Tirole (1997): the eﬀort of
the principal is a strategic substitute for that of the agent, if both eﬀorts can concur to
the solution of a decision problem. Likewise, here enforcement by oﬃcials depresses the
initiative by ﬁrms. The diﬀerence is that in our setting the principal’s eﬀo r tc a n n o td i r e c t l y
substitute for the ﬁrm’s initiative.
We continue the analysis of the optimal policy considering three further steps: how the
choice of enforcement E aﬀects welfare; how the legislator chooses the optimal ﬁnes F and
F; and how the optimal policy changes in response to diﬀerent probabilities of the social
harm, β.
Expected welfare, conditional on the ﬁrm choosing the optimal initiative and the optimal
implementable action, is:
E(W)=W0 + b I(E,F)[βw(b a(E,F,F)) + (1 − β)W − W0] − [g(E)+c(b I(E,F))],
where the ﬁrst term is the status-quo level of welfare, the second term:
∆E(c W) ≡ βw(b a)+( 1− β)W − W0
is the expected welfare gain (or loss) stemming from initiative, and the last term captures





[∆E(c W) − cb I]
∂b I
∂E | {z }
average deterrence ( + /−)
+
b Iβw0 ∂b a
∂E | {z }
marginal deterrence (+)
− g0 =0 . (8)
This derivative has a nice interpretation. The ﬁrst term captures the average deterrence
of enforcement — the extent to which E discourages initiative, reducing the probability of
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—1 1—any new action, whether legal or not. This eﬀect can be positive or negative, depending on
whether private initiative has a positive or negative marginal social value ∆E(c W) − cb I.10
The second eﬀect, instead, captures the marginal deterrence of enforcement — the extent
to which enforcement aﬀects the speciﬁc choice of actions when the latter generate social
harm (which occurs with ex-ante probability b Iβ). In contrast with average deterrence, the
eﬀect of marginal deterrence is always positive, because in the bad state welfare is assumed
to be decreasing in the ﬁrm’s actions (w0 < 0) and the latter are curtailed by enforcement
activity (∂b a/∂E < 0).
The last term of condition (8) is the marginal cost of deterrence. In an interior solution
the optimal enforcement level equates the sum of average and marginal deterrence to its
marginal cost. When private initiative is socially valuable, i.e. ∆E(c W) − cb I>0,a v e r a g e
deterrence calls for lower enforcement while marginal deterrence calls for higher enforcement.
When the marginal social value of initiative is negative, i.e. ∆E(c W)−cb I<0,b o t ha v e r a g e
and marginal deterrence require higher enforcement.
When private initiative is socially valuable, the enforcer faces a tradeoﬀ: in setting
the enforcement eﬀort, he must balance the beneﬁt of private initiative with the risk it
entails. This tradeoﬀ is reminiscent of the Hayekian idea that when private initiative is
expected to be welfare-enhancing we would like to moderate public intervention so as to
preserve private incentives.11 When, instead, private initiative is ex-ante socially damag-
ing, the trade-oﬀ vanishes: average and marginal deterrence work in the same direction,
unambiguously requiring higher enforcement.
We now turn to the second step in our analysis. The following Lemma (proved in the
Appendix) identiﬁes the optimal ﬁnes:
Lemma 3 The optimal ﬁnes are F = Fmin and F = Fmax.
When enforcement E∗ is positive, the legislator will always set the minimum and max-
imum ﬁnes at the lowest and highest feasible levels, respectively: this yields the greatest
eﬀective marginal deterrence, for any given enforcement eﬀort. This allows the legislator to
save on costly enforcement, as in Becker (1968), in the sense that the lowest implementable
10If β =0 ,t h e n∆E(f W) − ce I = W − W0 − (Π − Π0) > 0 by assumption (1), If instead β =1 ,t h e n
∆E(f W) − ce I = w(e a) − W0 − ce I<0, because even the least damaging action a reduces welfare below the
status quo: w(a) 6 W0, by assumption.
11Intuitively, the tradeoﬀ arises from the fact that the regulator has too few instruments to inﬂuence ﬁrm’s
choices of innovation and actions: indeed one can show that the tradeoﬀ disappears if the regulator is free
to subsidize socially beneﬁcial actions beside punishing socially harmful ones. (We thank Franck Portier
for raising this point.) In our setting, we assume that such subsidies are unavailable either because of their
budgetary costs or because they might create incentive for corrupt behavior by enforcers.
—1 2—action b a is obtained with the lowest amount of costly enforcement E. Average deterrence,
instead, is unaﬀected by changes in the minimum penalty F a n di sr a i s e db ya ni n c r e a s ei n
the maximum penalty F, since learning investment is chosen taking the expected proﬁts as
a reference. This latter are always equal to the “outside option” Π − EF.For this reason,
reducing punishment F for illegal actions up to b a does not increase expected proﬁts and
does not reduce average deterrence.12 On the contrary, increasing the maximum ﬁne F
reduces initiative b I and therefore raises average deterrence. It may appear surprising that,
when the marginal social value of initiative is positive, it is optimal to set the maximum
ﬁne at the highest possible level, thereby discouraging initiative. This apparent paradox is
explained by the legislator’s ability to correct the disincentive eﬀect of a larger ﬁne with a
lower enforcement intensity E∗.
We conclude our policy analysis by considering how the optimal policy changes with β,
the probability that the innovation is socially harmful. To this purpose, let us deﬁne a value
of β such that the corresponding optimal enforcement E∗ is zero:
β0(E =0 ,F = Fmin,F = Fmax):−[∆E(c W) − c0(b I)]
∂b I
∂E
= b Iβ0w0 ∂b a
∂E
. (9)
Then one can characterize the optimal enforcement as follows (see the Appendix for the
proof):
Lemma 4 The optimal enforcement level E∗ is zero if β ∈ [0,β0] and it is positive if
β ∈ (β0,1].
When social harm is very unlikely, i.e. β ∈ [0,β0], even if the norm were to deﬁne
welfare-reducing actions in A as illegal, it would be optimal not to enforce such a prohibition:
E∗ =0 . Anticipating that, the optimal norm prescribes that all the actions in A are legal
(“laissez faire” or “per-se legality rule”). When instead the probability that the innovation is
socially harmful is suﬃc i e n t l yh i g h( ( β ∈ (β0,1]), then the optimal enforcement is positive:
E∗ > 0.
The following proposition summarizes the optimal design of norms characterized so far:
Proposition 5 If β ∈ [0,β0], the regulator chooses a laissez-faire regime: ﬁnes are irrele-
vant because E∗ =0 . If social harm is more likely (β ∈ (β0,1]), then the regulator chooses
an eﬀect-based norm that forbids actions when these are ex-post welfare-reducing, designs
the ﬁne schedule with the maximum possible ﬂexibility (F = Fmin,F = Fmax), implements
the lowest action b a and enforces the policy optimally with E∗ > 0.
12Since the minimum ﬁne F and the implemented action e a are adjusted so as to leave the innovating ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁts unchanged (and equal to its “outside option” Π − EF). Hence, a lower minimum ﬁne F
comes together with a less proﬁtable (lower) implemented action e a, leaving net expected proﬁts and the
incentives to exert initiative unchanged.
—1 3—3.4 Comparison with the ﬁrst best
The ﬁrst best outcome provides a useful benchmark for the previous results. In the ﬁrst
best, the legislator controls ﬁrms’ choices directly without bearing any enforcement costs
(E =0 ). The welfare-maximizing action is a i nt h eg o o ds t a t ea n da0 in the bad state, so
that expected welfare is




The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to I yields the optimal investment
b IFB =
(1 − β)(W − W0)
c
. (10)
To compare b IFB with the equilibrium investment level b I(E,F) obtained in (7), notice that
W −W0 > Π−Π0 > F by assumption, so that when β is close to 0 (the bad state is very un-
likely) we have underinvestment: b IFB > b I. Since in this environment I is chosen according
to private beneﬁts while its social beneﬁts are larger, investment is below the ﬁrst best. By
t h es a m et o k e n ,w h e nβ is close to 1 (the bad state is very likely) we obtain overinvestment:
b IFB < b I. In this case, social beneﬁts are below private ones, and the ﬁrm chooses excessive
investment. Hence, our model produces underinvestment or overinvestment depending on
the likelihood of social harm.
3.5 Comparison with the traditional model
It is interesting to compare the results obtained so far with a setting where ﬁrms could
implement the actions in A without any investment in learning, as in the traditional model
of law enforcement where the choice between actions requires no previous initiative eﬀort.
Such a ﬁrm would choose the same actions that, according to Lemma 1, a ﬁrm chooses
under successful learning, that is, b a if the innovation is socially harmful and a otherwise. In
this setting, social welfare would be
E(W)=[ βw(b a(E,F,F)) + (1 − β)W] − g(E),
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Clearly, in this case regulation aﬀects private incentives only through marginal deterrence,
and enforcement is always positive if the innovation is socially harmful: since g0(0) = 0,i t
is evident that E∗ > 0 for β ∈ (0,1].M o r e o v e r ,m a x i m u mﬂexibility is clearly optimal also
in this case: F = Fmin and F = Fmax. The following Lemma states the diﬀerent scope of
“per-se legality rules” in the two cases:
Lemma 6 If new actions require no initiative eﬀort, then the laissez-faire regime is optimal
only if no social harm can occur (β =0 ). If instead new actions require initiative eﬀort,
then the laissez-faire regime is optimal also when social harm occurs with a positive small
probability, i.e. β ∈ [0,β0].
[Insert Figure 3]
Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal policy changes with the probability of the bad
state, β, in our as well as in the traditional model. The comparison helps to understand
the role of initiative in shaping public intervention: when private investment in learning
and innovation is an important piece of the story, the optimal design of norms requires to
limit the intervention by opting for the laissez-faire regime in a wider set of circumstances
(β ∈ [0,β0]). It is optimal to sacriﬁce marginal deterrence to preserve high initiative when
its marginal social value is suﬃciently high.
4 Corrupt oﬃcials
In the setting considered so far, enforcement oﬃcials collect evidence on the ﬁrms’ conduct
and on the welfare eﬀects of their actions, truthfully reporting these facts to a judge who
decides on the penalty according to a given ﬁne schedule. Since enforcement oﬃcials could
always be relied on to report their evidence truthfully, we could analyze policy design without
distinguishing between legislator and enforcers.
In this section, instead, we consider the agency problems that may arise in enforcement,
by exploring how the design and enforcement of norms is aﬀected when enforcement oﬃcials
are self-interested and uncommitted to truthful reporting. We denote the oﬃcial’s report
on the ﬁrm’s action by r = r(a) ∈ A. We maintain the previous setup, assuming that the





within the admissible range [Fmin,F max] and a ﬁne schedule obeying the
—1 5—principle of proportionality. In this setting, we explicitly recognize that the ﬁne paid by the




. This notation encompasses
t h ec a s eo ff a i t h f u lo ﬃcials examined in previous sections as a special case where r = a,s o
that F = F(a).
When oﬃcials are self-interested, they may extract rents from ﬁrms to misreport evidence
about their conduct. By misreporting the ﬁrms’ true actions, they can let the ﬁrm pay a
lower ﬁne than the statutory one in exchange for a bribe. More speciﬁcally, we assume that
while the judge can directly recognize the lawful action a0, he cannot distinguish among the
new actions a ∈ A and has to rely on the report r by the enforcement oﬃcial. The latter
cannot lie to the judge about the true state of nature s, but only on the action taken by
the ﬁrm: the enforcer can lie on the ﬁner pieces of information but not on the bolder ones.
Moreover, we assume that he cannot submit a false report r 6= a that damages the ﬁrm: if
he did, the ﬁrm would be able to rebut the false report by providing counter evidence. This
“no blackmail” assumption implies that, if there is social harm, the oﬃcial cannot report
an oﬀence that is more serious than the real one, i.e. an action r>a .
When he discovers that the ﬁrm’s innovation is socially harmful, the oﬃcial reports an
action r<a(less severely sanctioned than the real one) if he is oﬀered a bribe B greater
than a minimum bribe B > 0; otherwise, he reports truthfully. The “reservation bribe” B,
which will turn out to be a key parameter in the analysis, depends on the honesty of the
oﬃcial, as well as on the sanctions for corrupt oﬃcials.
The new timing of the model is as follows: at time 1 the legislator writes the norm,




and the maximum ﬁne F ∈ [F,F max],s e t st h e
enforcement eﬀort E and designs the ﬁne schedule F(r).A t t i m e 2 the oﬃcial sets the
bribe B to be requested from ﬁrms with socially harmful innovations in exchange for the
report r(a).A tt i m e3 the ﬁrm exerts learning eﬀort I.A tt i m e4 it takes the action, given
the outcome of its learning process. Finally, at time 5 actions produce their private payoﬀs
Π and their social consequences W;t h eo ﬃcial obtains evidence with probability E, ﬁles
ar e p o r tr a n dp o s s i b l yt a k e sab r i b eB in exchange for misreporting; conditioning on the
oﬃcial’s report, the judge levies the ﬁne F(r).14
4.1 Firm actions
As in the benchmark model, we proceed by solving the game backward, starting from stage
4 in which the ﬁrm chooses its action. When the new actions are harmful to society (s = b),
14This timing implicitly assumes that at stage 2 the oﬃcial commits to a given bribe B before the choices of
the ﬁrm are made. However, it can be shown that the results of this section would be qualitatively unchanged
if the bribe were set after the ﬁrm moves, provided the ﬁrm has some bargaining power in negotiating the
bribe.
—1 6—the ﬁrm has the following alternatives:
(i) not pay the bribe, so that the oﬃcial reports truthfully (r = a), and choose the most
proﬁtable action b anb,d e ﬁned by
b anb =a r gm a x
a∈A
[Π(a) − EF(a)],
(ii) pay the bribe B (so that the oﬃcial reports r(a) <a )a n ds e l e c tt h em o s tp r o ﬁtable
action b ab such that
b ab =a r gm a x
a∈A
{Π(a) − E [F(r(a)) + B]}.
If the ﬁrm chooses the ﬁrst course of action, its anticipated proﬁts are net of the expected
ﬁne; if it chooses the second, they are also net of the expected bribe. The following Lemma
characterizes the optimal actions chosen in each contingency:
Lemma 7 At stage 4, given E, F(r), r(a) and B,t h eﬁrm:
• chooses action a0 if learning is unsuccessful;
• chooses action a and does not pay any bribe if learning is successful and new actions
are not socially harmful (s = g);
• chooses action b ab and pays bribe B if learning is successful, new actions are socially
harmful (s = b)a n d Π(b anb) − EF(b anb) < Π(b ab) − E
£
F(r(b ab)) + B
¤
;
• chooses action b anb and does not pay any bribe if learning is successful, new actions
are socially harmful (s = b)a n d Π(b anb) − EF(b anb) > Π(b ab) − E
£
F(r(b ab)) + B
¤
.
Therefore, it is only when new actions are socially harmful that the ﬁrm’s behavior
diﬀers from that which was analyzed in the previous sections (see Lemma 1). In the present
case, the ﬁrm’s choice of action does not depend only on the policy variables F(r) and E,
as in the benchmark model, but also on the possibility of paying the bribe B to the oﬃcial
in exchange for his report r(a).
4.2 Firm initiative
At stage 3 the ﬁrm chooses its initiative, given the optimal actions to be chosen at stage
4, the enforcement policy F(r) and E chosen by the legislator, and the bribe B and the
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—1 7—This expression diﬀers from the earlier expression (2) only by the term in square brackets,
which is the payoﬀs obtained when the initiative is successful and the new actions are socially
harmful. In this case, the ﬁrm must choose between the best action that it can pick without
bribing the oﬃcial and its best action conditional on bribing the oﬃcial.
The optimal initiative b Ic , where the superscript c refers to corruption, is described in
the following Lemma.
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¡
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+( 1− β)Π − Π0
c
.
Proof. The result follows immediately from the ﬁrst order condition.
4.3 Bribe and oﬃcial’s report
At stage 2 the oﬃcial sets the bribe that he requests in exchange for misreporting, that is
for reporting an action r(a) <a , given the policy variables set by the legislator. Clearly, for
misreporting not to be detectable, the misreported action must be the same as the action
o p t i m a l l yc h o s e nb yt h eﬁrm in the absence of bribing: r(b ab)=r(b anb)=b anb.W ea s s u m e
that the equilibrium bribe b B is determined as the outcome of Nash bargaining between the
ﬁrm and the oﬃcial, where the ﬁrm’s and the oﬃcial’s bargaining power are γ and 1 − γ,
respectively. The following Lemma identiﬁes the optimal bribe b B and reporting b r(a):
Lemma 9 Given E and F(a),a no ﬃcial takes a bribe
b B = B +( 1− γ)
∙





in exchange for reporting r(a)=b anb for any a>b anb. He does not take any bribe and reports
truthfully if b B 6 B.
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which is solved by
b B = γB +( 1− γ)
½




F(r(b ab)) − F(b anb)
i¾
.
Taking into account that r(b ab)=r(b anb)=b anb, the solution becomes
b B = γB +( 1− γ)
Π(b ab) − Π(b anb)
E
.
—1 8—The oﬃcial will accept the bribe b B provided it exceeds B. Moreover, to maximize his bribe,
the oﬃcial will be ready to misreport any action above b anb. By doing so, he will induce the
ﬁrm to choose the worst possible action, that is, b ab = a, since this pushes its proﬁt Π(b ab)
to the maximal level Π. By using this fact and rearranging, one obtains (12).
Note that the misreporting schedule optimally chosen by the oﬃcial when he takes the
bribe induces the ﬁrm to choose the worst possible action a, since this is the action that
maximizes the gains from corruption.
The equilibrium bribe (12) has a simple interpretation: to misreport, the oﬃcial must
obtain a premium over and above his reservation bribe B, and this premium is a share 1−γ
(his bargaining power) of the net increase in the joint net surplus that both parties derive
from misreporting (the expression in square brackets).15 For the inequality in (12) to hold,
this premium must be positive: in other words, bribing occurs only if:
Π − Π(b anb) − EB > 0. (13)
It is up to the legislator to prevent this condition from being met, by implementing the
appropriate action b anb through the design of the ﬁne schedule. This leads us to stage 1 of
the game.
4.4 Norm design
At stage 1, the legislator sets the policy variables so as to maximize welfare, taking into
account the subsequent self-interested behavior of oﬃcials. He anticipates that by aﬀecting
the implementable action b anb,h em o d i ﬁes the rents from misreporting and thereby the
maximum bribe that the oﬃcial will be able to request. For the legislator, it is always
optimal to induce the action b anb rather than b ab = a (when the bribe is paid).
As in the benchmark model, we can restrict our analysis to stepwise ﬁne schedules: the
implemented action will occur at the point of discontinuity in the schedule, so that lower
actions are sanctioned with the minimum ﬁne F and higher actions with the maximum ﬁne
F. The optimal implementable action b anb = b ac is the lowest action that makes the bribe
unattractive, that is, induces inequality (13) to fail:
Π − Π(b ac)=EB, (14)
which implies




15This joint net surplus is the increase in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts minus the disutility incurred by the oﬃcial
when misreporting (−B).
—1 9—Therefore, the action that the legislator can induce depends on the enforcement eﬀort and
on the corruptibility of oﬃcials. A greater enforcement E and a higher reservation bribe B
allow the legislator to implement a less harmful action:
∂b ac
∂E
= −Π−10[.]B 6 0 and
∂b ac
∂B
= −Π−10[.]E 6 0. (16)
When B =0 , i.e. when the oﬃcial is ready to accept even a negligible bribe in order
to misreport, then b ac = a, implying that marginal deterrence is completely lost. On the
contrary, when B > F − F we are back to the benchmark case of loyal oﬃcials and the
implementable action is b a. Oﬃcials are corruptible but their reservation bribe is so high
that the incentive constraint to avoid the payment of a bribe never binds. Moreover, the
optimal implementable action b ac does not depend either on the minimum ﬁne F (which is
paid regardless of whether the ﬁrm pays the bribe) or on the relative bargaining power γ
(which aﬀects only the split of the surplus from misreporting, not its total size).
The optimal ﬁne schedule that leads the ﬁrm to prefer action b ac (without paying any
bribe) to action a (when paying the bribe), implicitly excludes that the ﬁrm might prefer a
third option: choosing the most proﬁtable illegal action a and, if caught, instead of paying
the bribe, paying the full ﬁne F.But the ﬁrm will never take this option, since b anb is deﬁned
as the action that gives the highest net proﬁts, i.e. Π(b anb) − EF > Π − EF.
Equation (14) implies a restriction on the range of ﬁnes that the legislator can use in
designing the optimal ﬁne schedule. We can see that upon subtracting EF from both sides
and rearranging, equation (14) can be rewritten as
Π(b ac) − EF = Π − E(F + B).
This equality, jointly with the condition Π(b anb) − EF > Π − EF,y i e l d s
Π(b ac) − EF = Π − E(F + B) > Π − EF,
implying that
F − F > B. (17)
So the oﬃcial’s reservation bribe B determines the range of ﬁnes (17) consistent with the
incentive constraint, as well as marginal deterrence (as shown by (15)).
Now we can rewrite the expression for the expected proﬁts (11) in a simpler fashion.
Using the equilibrium values F(b anb)=F(r(b ab)) = F, Π(b ab)=Π, Π(b anb)=Π(b ac) and
exploiting the equality in (14), expected proﬁts become:




—2 0—yielding the following expression for the optimal initiative level chosen by the ﬁrm:
b Ic =
Π − βE(F + B) − Π0
c
.
Hence, the optimal initiative depends, as in the benchmark model, on the “outside-option”
proﬁts, which in the case of corrupt oﬃcials, are those obtained upon paying the bribe.




















Therefore, the reservation bribe has a similar eﬀect to that of an increase in enforcement or
ﬁnes: if oﬃcials are less corruptible, inducing them to misreport would require a higher bribe,
which reduces the equilibrium net proﬁto fﬁrms and therefore depresses their initiative.
We continue the analysis of the optimal policy considering three further steps: How the
choice of enforcement E aﬀects welfare; how the legislator chooses the optimal ﬁnes F and
F;a n dﬁnally, how the optimal policy changes in response to diﬀerent reservation bribes B.
Expected welfare, conditional on the optimal implementable action b ac and initiative b Ic,
is:
E(Wc)=W0 + b Ic(E,F,B)[βw(b ac(E,B)) + (1 − β)W − W0] − [g(E)+c(b Ic(E,F,B))].




[∆E(c Wc) − cb Ic]
∂b Ic
∂E | {z }
average deterrence ( + / − )
+
b Icβw0∂b ac
∂E | {z }
marginal deterrence (+)
− g0 =0 , (19)
where ∆E(c Wc) ≡ βw(b ac)+( 1− β)W − W0 is the expected change in welfare relative to
the status quo if the initiative is successful, while the term in square brackets measures the
marginal social value of initiative.
In equation (19), the ﬁrst term captures average deterrence. As before, this eﬀect can be
negative or positive, depending on whether initiative has a positive or a negative marginal
social value. The second term corresponds to the marginal deterrence eﬀect, and it is
positive if B > 0, since a higher enforcement eﬀort E allows to implement a lower action,
i.e. a socially better one.
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—2 1—Now we turn to the second step in our analysis, identifying the optimal ﬁnes. Let us
deﬁne, consistently with our analysis of the benchmark model, a level of the probability
of the bad state, βc
0, such that
∂E(Wc)
∂E =0when E =0 . In addition, let us also deﬁne a
second threshold level, βc
0, such that the marginal social value is zero: ∆E(c Wc) − cb Ic =0 .
The following Lemma (proved in the Appendix) establishes the relationship between the
two thresholds:
Lemma 10 0 <β c
0 <β c
0 < 1.
Equipped with these two thresholds, we can now analyze the level of ﬁnes chosen within
the available range [Fmin,F max]. Notice that the minimum ﬁne F inﬂuences the level of
initiative b Ic but not the implementable action b ac. Hence, setting the minimum ﬁne aﬀects
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average deterrence ( + / − )
When the marginal social value of initiative and the optimal enforcement E∗ are positive,






, this derivative is negative and it is optimal to set
F = Fmin.
The maximum ﬁne, in this case, is deﬁned by the constraint F − F > B, which implies
F ∈ [Fmin + B,F max].
For higher values of the probability of the bad state, i.e. for β>β c
0 we have ∆E(c Wc)−cb Ic <
0,i m p l y i n g
∂E(Wc)
∂F > 0. In this case the legislator will want to raise the minimum ﬁne
as much as possible, in order to discourage initiative. This, together with the constraint
F −F > B, requires the maximum ﬁne to be as high as possible and such that F −F = B.
The optimal ﬁnes then are:
F = Fmax and F = Fmax − B.
These ﬁnes, and the actions that they induce, are illustrated in Figure 4. The ﬁgure shows
that the action implemented with corrupt oﬃcials, b ac, exceeds (for given enforcement) and
therefore is worse than the action that would be implemented with loyal oﬃcials, b a,w h i c h
is the same as shown in Figure 2. So the corruptibility of enforcement oﬃcials reduces the
welfare level that the legislator can hope to achieve.
[Insert Figure 4]
—2 2—We can summarize the above discussion in the following Proposition, which is illustrated
in Figure 5:
Proposition 11 If β ∈ [0,βc
0] the regulator chooses a laissez-faire regime and ﬁnes are






), the regulator chooses an eﬀect-based
norm that forbids ex-post welfare-reducing actions, designs the ﬁne schedule with the greatest
possible ﬂexibility (F = Fmin,F = Fmax), implements the lowest action b ac and enforces the






legislator reduces the ﬂexibility of the norm by setting F = Fmax and F = Fmax − B.
[Insert Figure 5]
The previous Proposition shows that, when innovation is very likely to result in socially
harmful actions, the legislator must respond to a decrease in the reservation bribe B (less
loyal oﬃcials) by raising the minimum ﬁne and thereby restricting the range of ﬁnes, in
contrast with what was found for the case with loyal enforcers (where the range of ﬁnes is
always maximal: see Lemma 3). The following Corollary summarizes these results:
Corollary 12 A decrease in enforcers’ loyalty (B) raises the minimum ﬁne F = Fmax −B
and reduces the norm’s ﬂexibility (F − F = B).
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we study the design and enforcement of norms that apply to private actions
made possible by innovative activity, that we label as “private initiative”. We highlight their
eﬀects not only on the choices of private agents but also on the very incentives to innovate.
We consider eﬀect-based norms, that is, norms which penalize actions on the basis of their
ex-post eﬀects on welfare. The ﬂexibility of norms depends on the possibility of assigning
diﬀerent ﬁnes to diﬀerent actions, i.e. on the range of ﬁnes admitted.
Initially we develop the model under the assumption that law enforcers are loyal. In this
case, when the new actions are socially harmful, the ﬁne schedule induces ﬁrms to select a less
harmful action than they would have done otherwise (marginal deterrence). Enforcement
by the regulator makes marginal deterrence more eﬀective and reduces the expected proﬁts
of ﬁrms, and therefore their initiative (average deterrence). This is desirable if, in expected
terms, initiative reduces welfare, i.e. if social harm is relatively likely. But if initiative is
ex-ante welfare enhancing, then the eﬀects of enforcement eﬀort via marginal and average
deterrence work in opposite directions. So the legislator will choose a laissez-faire regime
if the marginal social value of initiative is positive and suﬃciently large, i.e. if social harm
—2 3—is unlikely, and a ﬂexible norm otherwise. Indeed in the latter case maximizing the range
of ﬁnes (choosing a ﬂexible norm) sharpens marginal deterrence without reducing average
deterrence.
When we abandon the assumption of loyal enforcers, that is, consider oﬃcials who can
misreport the action observed in exchange for a bribe, marginal deterrence is reduced. When
social harm is suﬃciently likely, in order to prevent the ﬁrm from paying a bribe and take
the worst action, the legislator must become less ambitious in designing regulation: he must
accept that the ﬁrm carries out a more proﬁtable and socially damaging action. Another
consequence of corruption is that the legislator must compress the ﬁne schedule by increasing
the minimum ﬁne, thereby reducing both the ﬂexibility of the law and the private incentives
to innovate.
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=[ ∆E(c W) − cb I]
∂b I
∂E
+ b Iβw0 ∂b a
∂E
− g0 6 0 (22)
Recall that:
∂e a
∂E = −Π−10[.](F − F) 6 0,
∂e a
∂F = Π−10[.]E > 0,
∂e a













∂F =0then F and F are indeterminate.
We want to check if for values of β such that E∗ > 0 F and F can assume interior values.
i) For F, this is false, given that the ﬁrst order condition with respect to F is always
negative.
ii) For F, substitute ∂e I
∂F ,
∂e a
∂F , ∂e I
∂E and
∂e a
∂Ein the ﬁrst order conditions to get:
∂E(W)
∂F
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−Π−10[.](F)
¢
− g0 =0 (24)
where both conditions are evaluated at the same b I, b a, F =0 , E∗ and F.
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Assume E∗ > 0.T h e n g0 = F
n










For E∗ > 0 we have g0 > 0 and this, together with F>0,i m -
plies
n
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¢o
> 0. Next, E∗ > 0 and
n











∂F > 0. In other words, F
is always equal to Fmax when E∗ > 0.
Finally, since the only interior solution in the program is for E∗, the second order
conditions are satisﬁed given
∂2E(W)
∂E2 < 0.
—2 5—P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . When β =0the ﬁrst term in (8) is negative, given (1); the
second term is zero and the third is negative. Hence, we have a corner solution at E∗ =0 .
When β =1 , then both the ﬁrst and second terms of (8) are positive, and the third must
therefore be negative. Hence, ∂E(W)/∂E =0implies an interior solution with E∗ > 0.
Notice that given the deﬁnition of β0,w h e nE =0and the ﬁnes are optimally set at
F = Fmin,F = Fmax the ﬁrst two terms in (8) cancel out and, given that g0(0) = 0 by
assumption, ∂E(W)/∂E =0at E∗ =0 .I no t h e rw o r d s ,β0 is deﬁn e dc o n s i s t e n t l yw i t ht h e
optimal policy program, which implies at β0 an interior solution with E∗ =0 .
N e x t ,w ew a n tt os h o wt h a tβ0 is unique. First, since we have just shown that E∗ =0





If instead there were multiple β0’s, we would obtain an internal solution E∗ =0for each
















∂E2 < 0 due to the second order conditions, signdE∗
dβ = sign
∂2E(W)
∂E∂β .N o t e t h a t ,








+( ∆E(c W) − cb I(0))
∂2b I(0)
∂E∂β
+ b I(0)w0 ∂b a
∂E
. (27)
From the deﬁnition of β0, the last term in the derivative equals
b I(0)w0 ∂b a
∂E





























Hence, we have shown that
dE∗
dβ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
β0
> 0,
that is, at β0 the optimal enforcement is always increasing in β. Therefore, there cannot
be multiple values of β such that the optimal enforcement is zero as an internal solution.
Summarizing, the optimal policy program implies an unique interior solution with E∗ =0
at β = β0, positive levels of enforcement for β>β 0, and a corner solution with E∗ =0for
β<β 0.
—2 6—P r o o fo fL e m m a1 0 . The ﬁrst threshold βc
0 is deﬁned by:
βc
0(E =0 ,F = Fmin,F > Fmin + B):−[∆E(c Wc) − cb Ic]
∂b Ic
∂E
= b Icβw0∂b ac
∂E
.







then the optimal enforcement E∗ is zero for β ∈ [0,βc
0] and positive for β>β c
0. Hence, βc
0
is unique. Moreover, notice that at βc
0 the marginal social value of initiative is positive, i.e.
∆E(c Wc) − cb Ic > 0.
The second threshold βc
0 is deﬁned by:
βc
0(E = E∗ > 0,F = Fmax − B,F = Fmax):∆E(c Wc) − cb Ic =0 .
From the deﬁnition of βc
0 we know that at β = βc
0 the ﬁrst term in (19) is zero, the second
is positive and the third is negative. Since g0(E) > 0 for E>0 by assumption, we conclude
that E∗ > 0 at β = βc
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Figure 3: Optimal policy and initiative
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Figure 5: Optimal policy with corrupt oﬃcials
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